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It has been a quinquennium since the electronic 
discovery practice directions (e-discovery PD) was 
issued on 30 July 2009 as Practice Direction Number 3 
of 2009.1 Referred to in shorthand as PD3, it heralded 
a new chapter in maturity of Singapore’s civil 
procedural rules. 
PD3 was received in some quarters with the sense of 
excitement that comes with new opportunities – 
there was talk that e-discovery could be a new area of 
legal practice – but also with a healthy dose of dread 
in other quarters, as the march of technology 
compelled litigators to deal with new concepts like de-
duplication, metadata and native format, while 
concomitantly having to navigate the e-discovery and 
inspection protocols. The one aspect of PD3 that was 
unusual – and in hindsight unnecessary – was that 
unlike other practice directions that had to be 
complied with in every applicable case, PD3 was 
optional. This concept was as alien as the concept of 
good faith collaboration that it introduced to the 
adversarial arena of high stakes civil litigation. As 
observed elsewhere, this fomented skirmishes on how 
the opt-in regime was to operate.2 Interestingly, the 
opt-in regime was grafted into PD3 after practitioners 
who were consulted on an earlier draft requested that 
a more gradual introduction of the new procedural 
framework ought to be adopted, and suggested that 
an opt-in framework be adopted. 
PD3 was incorporated into the Supreme Court 
Practice Directions 2010 as Part IVA. In 2012, 
following a review of discovery laws that took place in 
the latter part of 2011, it underwent a revision that 
excised the opt-in framework in favour of a tiered 
                                                          
1 Practice Direction No 3 of 2009, ‘Discovery and Inspection of 
Electronically Stored Documents’ (30 July 2009) at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/data/doc/ManagePage/temp/4nuc3c
45i15f0f45uffl1b55/practice_direction_no.3_of_2009.pdf . 
2 See Zee Kin Yeong and Serena Lim, ‘Electronic Discovery: An 
Evolution of Law and Practice’ in Seiu Kin Lee and Zee Kin Yeong, 
eds, International Conference on Electronic Litigation (Academy 
Publishing, 2012), at 
http://www.litiedge.com/images/pdfs/anevolutionoflaw.pdf . 
approach, introduced the concept of electronic 
documents that are not reasonably accessible and 
included a checklist of questions that was intended to 
assist solicitor and client to prepare for the good faith 
meet-and-confer that is a crucial component of the e-
discovery PD.3 
Following a major revision of the Supreme Court 
Practice Directions in 2013 necessitated by the 
Singapore Judiciary’s change to a new electronic filing 
service, the e-discovery PD is now found in Part V.4 
Objectives 
The e-discovery PD did not set out to change the law 
but to provide guidance on how existing legal 
principles on discovery are to be applied to the 
disclosure, inspection and provision of copies of 
electronic documents. This objective was articulated 
in Sanae Achar v Sci-Gen Ltd,5 at [11], in the following 
manner: 
The e-Discovery PD was introduced in 2009 
with the aim of providing guidance on how 
existing legal principles pertaining to the 
discovery process could be applied in respect 
of electronically stored documents. One of its 
objectives is to promote the exchange of 
electronically stored documents in a text 
searchable electronic form (in lieu of printed 
copies) so that parties may capitalise on the 
twin benefits of digitisation, viz, the ability to 
run keyword searches on the documents in 
question as well as easy management of the 
same. This also has the added benefit of 
avoiding unnecessary photocopying or 
printing of electronically stored documents. 
The e-Discovery PD also prefers the inspection 
and supply of copies of electronic documents 
                                                          
3 Amendment No 1 of 2012, at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=4122 . 
4 Amendment No 3 of 2012, at 
http://app.supremecourt.gov.sg/default.aspx?pgID=4122 . 
5 [2011] 3 SLR 967; [2011] SGHC 87. 
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in their native formats without any 
interference with the documents’ ‘metadata 
information’. … Paragraph 43G of the e-
Discovery PD prohibits the deletion, removal 
or alteration of metadata information 
internally stored in the native format of 
discoverable electronically stored documents 
without consent by the relevant parties or 
leave of court. 
The e-discovery PD performs its function by 
supplementing the main branches of discovery rules. 
The traditional test that is applied in determining 
whether documents are discoverable requires the 
consideration of whether a document is relevant, and 
if so relevant, whether its disclosure is necessary in 
order to facilitate the disposal of the action fairly and, 
even if its disclosure is necessary in this sense, 
whether its disclosure will save costs – these latter 
factors are frequently abbreviated to ‘necessity’. The 
e-discovery PD articulates the traditional concepts of 
relevance and necessity in more modern formulation 
that is easier to grasp, especially when dealing with 
modern-day volumes of discovery – whether a 
document is material and whether its disclosure is 
proportionate and economical. A non-exhaustive list 
of factors that will have to be considered in this 
determination is also provided.6 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the past five years have seen only a single 
case that had to apply the considerations of 
proportionality in coming to a decision to adopt an e-
discovery protocol.7 In all other cases, the issues 
between parties were focused in areas other than the 
threshold question of whether the adoption of an e-
discovery protocol was proportionate. 
A second objective of the e-discovery PD is to 
promote the exchange of electronic documents in 
their native format and – by implication – in softcopy. 
Underpinning this is a return to first principles: if the 
document that is to be disclosed lies in parties’ 
possession as a softcopy document, for example in 
the hard disk of a notebook or personal computer, 
then the discovery obligation attaches to that 
electronic document in its native format and that is 
the version that has to be made available for 
inspection,8 and it is a softcopy of that electronic 
                                                          
6 Para 48, Part V. 
7 See Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen and others [2010] 
SGHC 125, at [22], and following. 
8 Para 50, Part V. 
document which has to be disclosed. Further, the e-
discovery PD exhorts that any metadata information 
that exists in the electronic document in its native 
format should not be intentionally deleted or altered.9 
The provision of discoverable electronic documents in 
their native format is intended to facilitate easy 
management of these documents: it enables solicitors 
to make use of document review systems to conduct 
searches, and to review and mark documents as they 
prepare for the eventual trial. In this context, the 
traditional method of printing electronic documents 
and providing printouts is going to be increasingly 
unacceptable, both from a professional perspective 
(for instance, the loss of metadata that may 
potentially be relevant to the case when electronic 
documents are printed) and from a costs perspective 
(such as the increased costs associated with managing 
printouts will soon become significant as access to 
affordable document review systems increase and the 
costs differential may be increasingly unacceptable to 
discerning clients, particularly corporate clients). 
Overview of Part V 
The e-discovery PD mirrors the procedural steps that 
are traditionally practised during discovery. I had 
summarised this in Fermin Aldabe v Standard 
Chartered Bank10 at [27] – [28], in the following 
manner: 
Discovery and inspection: law and practice 
27. Without delving into the case law relating 
to discovery, I propose first to set out briefly 
the classical sequence in which discovery and 
inspection takes place under Order 24. 
Discovery of documents is given by 
enumerating them in a list of documents, the 
completeness of which is to be verified by 
affidavit. The list typically contains a notice 
stating the time and place at which the party 
served with the notice may inspect the 
documents referred to in the list. The list and 
affidavit verifying are served on the other 
parties in the action. At the appointed time 
and place, the enumerated documents are 
produced for physical inspection and the 
inspecting party is entitled to take a copy of 
the inspected documents during inspection. 
                                                          
9 Para 52, Part V. 
10 [2009] SGHC 194. 
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28. Hence, inspection and the taking of copies 
occurs concurrently in the classical sequence. 
However, there is a common practice for 
parties to agree that copies of all documents 
enumerated in each party’s list of documents 
be exchanged first and for physical inspection 
of documents to be deferred. After copies of 
documents have been exchanged, a party is 
still entitled to request for inspection of 
specified documents pursuant to the 
agreement to defer physical inspection. … 
General discovery 
The e-discovery PD commences by describing the 
categories of cases that it applies to: cases where the 
amount in dispute is above SGD 1 million, or where 
discoverable documents exceed 2,000 pages or where 
the discoverable documents are predominantly 
electronic documents. 
For these categories of cases, parties have an 
obligation to consider the adoption of the e-discovery 
PD. In aid of this, the e-discovery PD provides a 
checklist of questions that solicitors are encouraged 
to use as a guide in their discussions with client. When 
going through the checklist, parties will have to 
address their minds to who the key witnesses are and 
who has custody of the majority of discoverable 
documents, how these are stored and may be 
retrieved, whether it is proportionate to search and 
review all repositories of electronic documents that 
have been identified or whether it is feasible to 
proceed with discovery in stages, and whether 
keyword searches should be used (instead of 
traditional ocular review) to identify discoverable 
documents. I had opined that ‘keyword searches of 
unallocated space … as part of general discovery 
would usually be unnecessary by reason of their costs 
and the uncertainty that such searches will turn up 
anything which may contribute to the fair disposal of 
the cause or matter’ [emphasis added].11 The 2012 
revision of the e-discovery PD has included this aspect 
of discovery, which provides, in the template e-
discovery plan, that electronic documents that are not 
reasonably accessible are not within the scope of 
general discovery.12 
                                                          
11 Robin Duanne Littau v Astrata (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 
61, at [29]. 
12 Para 1(c), Agreed Electronic Discovery Plan, Appendix E Part 2, 
e-discovery PD. 
Having discussed with their clients, solicitors are to 
exchange the checklists and to engage in good faith 
discussions in a collaborative effort to come to an 
agreement as to how general discovery should be 
conducted. This is a marked departure from the 
tradition of unilateral decision making in disclosure. 
Taken in the right spirit, good faith discussions will 
provide an early insight into what the adversary 
considers to be relevant and necessary for discovery 
and some discovery disputes may be avoided if such 
differences are addressed during the good faith 
discussions.13 Given the more involved nature of 
providing disclosure and copies of electronic 
documents, the e-discovery PD provides a template e-
discovery plan that parties can modify and adopt. The 
e-discovery plan sets out the entire process of how 
discoverable documents are to be disclosed, 
inspected and softcopies provided. 
Further and better list and specific discovery 
Oftentimes, general discovery is found wanting and 
the other party will request for a further and better 
list, on the basis that certain classes of documents 
that ought to have been disclosed had not been. Or 
the other party, having reviewed the documents 
disclosed as part of general discovery, identifies train-
of-inquiry documents and makes a request for specific 
discovery. Without changing the established principles 
that mark out the boundaries of permissible requests 
for further or specific discovery, the e-discovery PD 
adapts these principles in providing for a new manner 
of describing a class of documents by making use of 
search terms. In order to avoid embarking on a fishing 
expedition – the trawling an unlimited sea14 – and to 
ensure that the line is dropped at an identifiable spot, 
the e-discovery PD requires that requests for further 
or specific discovery that make use of search terms be 
limited by custodians and repositories, as well as time 
periods. 
When it comes to a request for discovery of 
documents that are not reasonably accessible –which 
are defined to include ‘(a) deleted files or file 
                                                          
13 See Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen and others [2010] 
SGHC 125, at [38], and following. 
14 Per Choo Han Teck JC (as he then was) in Thyssen Hunnebeck 
Singapore Pte Ltd v TTJ Civil Engineering Pte Ltd [2003] 1 SLR(R) 
75; [2002] SGHC 247, at [6]: ‘In my view, I would hold that a “fishing 
expedition” in the context of discovery refers to the aimless trawling 
of an unlimited sea. Where, on the other hand, the party concerned 
knows a specific and identifiable spot into which he wishes to drop a 
line (or two), I would not regard that as a “fishing expedition”.’ 
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fragments containing information which may be 
recovered only through the use of computer forensic 
tools or techniques; and (b) documents archived using 
backup software and stored off-line on backup tapes 
or other storage media’15 – it must additionally be 
demonstrated that ‘the relevance and materiality of 
the electronically stored documents sought to be 
discovered justify the cost and burden of retrieving 
and producing them.’16 
Inspection and supply of copies 
Flowing from the principle that the right of inspection 
attaches to the electronic document in the format 
that it exists in within the possession, custody or 
power of the party giving discovery, inspection of 
electronic documents has to be given in their native 
formats. Unlike hardcopy documents, electronic 
documents require more than a well-lit room for 
inspection to take place. The e-discovery PD 
articulates the fundamental obligation that the party 
disclosing the electronic documents ought to provide 
reasonable means and assistance in order to give 
effect to the right of inspection. I had observed in 
Fermin Aldabe v Standard Chartered Bank,17 at [40] – 
[42], that: 
40. … It has been held (in the context of 
inspection of documentary samples by 
experts) that inspection is not limited to 
ocular examination and equipment may be 
used to inspect documents: per Sundaresh 
Menon JC, in UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine & Fire 
Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Others 
[2006] 4 SLR 95; [2006] SGHC 142, at [66]. In 
Grant and Another v Southwestern and 
County Properties Ltd and Another [1975] 1 Ch 
185, the court had to decide whether a tape 
recording was a document which was 
discoverable. In holding that a tape recording 
was a document for the purposes of 
discovery, Walton J observed as follows (at 
page 198C-F): 
… it seems to me that the simplest 
and most foolproof method of 
‘inspection’ in these cases is for the 
party giving discovery to play the tape 
to the party to whom discovery is 
                                                          
15 Para 44(6), e-discovery PD. 
16 Para 47(5), e-discovery PD. 
17 [2009] SGHC 194. 
being given, and for that party to 
make his own recording as it is 
played. 
41. The principle of law which was articulated 
here is that where a document cannot be 
meaningfully examined by ocular 
examination, the party giving discovery has an 
obligation to provide the technical means 
necessary in order to give effect to the 
inspecting party’s right of inspection. This is 
the approach which is adopted in Practice 
Direction 3 of 2009: the party producing 
electronically stored documents has to 
provide reasonable means and assistance for 
inspection (paragraph 43F). 
42. In the present case, the email messages 
are stored electronically on the Defendant’s 
email servers. The Defendant has to provide 
the technical means necessary in order to give 
effect to the Plaintiff’s right to inspect the 14 
email messages which he had identified. At a 
minimum, the Defendant has to provide a 
computer system from which the relevant 
email mailboxes may be accessed and the 14 
email messages displayed on screen for the 
Plaintiff to view. However, this is not to say 
that the Plaintiff would be given full access to 
the email mailboxes of the Defendant’s 
employees. I am mindful of Vinelott J’s 
observations in Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 
9) [1991] 1 WLR 652 concerning the 
difficulties in providing inspection of 
databases, and also of the Defendant’s 
concerns of breaches of confidentiality and 
banking secrecy. The Plaintiff had also 
articulated his intention to view the header 
information of the 14 email messages. I 
thought that a sensible approach would be for 
the Defendant to assist by providing an 
operator who would retrieve each of these 14 
email messages and display them on screen 
for the Plaintiff’s inspection, and call up the 
metadata information (eg header 
information) which the Plaintiff intended to 
inspect. However, it is prudent for the 
Defendant to be given an opportunity to 
review the metadata information for the 
purpose of determining if there was any basis 
for objecting to production for inspection 
before it is shown to the Plaintiff. 
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In Singapore, the courts have defined documents to 
include compendious documents such as electronic 
databases and storage devices (for instance hard 
disks).18 It has also been held in Alliance Management 
SA v Pendleton Lane P that for the inspection of such 
compendious documents, an inspection protocol 
should be put in place to prevent trawling and to 
safeguard confidential or privileged documents from 
disclosure.19 The e-discovery PD provides a template 
inspection protocol that is tailored for these purposes 
and – following the principle laid down in Alliance 
Management SA v Pendleton Lane P – requires that 
every application for inspection of electronic 
databases or forensic inspection of hard disks be 
accompanied by an inspection protocol. 
This concludes our quick overview of the e-discovery 
PD. Before we turn our attention in the following 
section to specific areas where e-discovery disputes 
have provided opportunities for our courts to 
articulate the applicable policies and principles, it is 
pertinent to consider the following exhortation in 
Earles v Barclays Bank Plc20 at [71], that solicitors 
ought to be familiar with the e-discovery PD: 
It might be contended that CPR 31 PD 2A and 
electronic disclosure are little known or 
practised outside the Admiralty and 
Commercial Court.  If so, such myth needs to 
be swiftly dispelled when over 90% of 
business documentation is electronic in form. 
The Practice Direction is in the Civil Procedure 
Rules and those practising in civil courts are 
expected to know the rules and practice 
them; it is gross incompetence not to. 
Although these observations were made with respect 
to the practice directions relating to disclosure in 
England & Wales, the message is universal. 
Discovery sans frontieres  
Given the prevalence of web-based e-mail (or web 
mail) in this modern information age, it is not 
surprising that the jurisdictional boundaries of 
discovering web mail are tested. E-mails that are 
downloaded using the (relatively) more traditional 
                                                          
18 For which see Megastar Entertainment Pte Ltd v Odex Pte Ltd 
[2005] 3 SLR 91; Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P 
[2007] 4 SLR(R) 343; [2007] SGHC 133. 
19 Per Belinda Ang J in Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane 
P, [2007] 4 SLR(R) 343; [2007] SGHC 133, at [35] – [36]. 
20 [2009] EWHC 2500 (QB). 
Post Office Protocol (POP) and that reside on our hard 
disks are undoubtedly within our possession, custody 
or power. The question becomes more challenging 
when the e-mails are viewed via a web browser (that 
is, web mail) or an e-mail client using a remote access 
protocol such as Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP). The e-mails reside on the mail server 
and is viewed remotely. The question is whether such 
e-mails are within the possession, custody or power of 
the account holder. 
These issues were considered in the case of Dirak Asia 
Pte Ltd v Chew Hua Kok.21 The plaintiff was the former 
employer of the defendant. The claims were for 
breaches of the employment contract and included 
the usual claims of breaches of the former employee’s 
duty of fidelity in the unauthorised disclosure of 
confidential information. The documents that the 
former employer sought were e-mails that the 
defendant had sent using the e-mail account that his 
current employer had provided. The relevant e-mails 
were in the online e-mail account of the defendant’s 
current employer. The defendant objected to 
disclosure on the basis that these e-mails were not 
within his possession, custody or power. 
The court undertook a two pronged analysis, 
examining whether the defendant had a legal right to 
the e-mails and also conducting a factual inquiry into 
whether the defendant had the practical ability to 
obtain access to or obtain the e-mails, before coming 
to its conclusion that the e-mails were within the 
defendant’s power to obtain. It commenced its 
analysis with a consideration of the common premise 
that a document is within one’s power if one has the 
legal right to obtain the document, which it rests on 
the holding in Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum,22 at [635]:  
… in the context of the phrase ‘possession, 
custody or power’ the expression ‘power’ 
must, in my view, mean a presently 
enforceable legal right to obtain from 
whoever actually holds the document 
inspection of it without the need to obtain the 
consent of anyone else. 
The court went on to consider more recent decisions 
in England & Wales, where the Court of Appeal had 
adopted a more flexible contextual analysis to 
determine whether there was a practical ability to 
                                                          
21 [2013] SGHCR 1. 
22 [1980] 1 WLR 627. 
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obtain the documents. The rationale being that a 
strict compliance with the requirement of a legal right 
to obtain the documents was too rigid. The approach 
recently, in the Court of Appeal in England & Wales at 
least, is to consider the degree of control the party 
liable to disclose the documents had over the entity 
with actual possession of the documents. This 
contextual approach can be traced back to the 
speeches of Lord Denning MR and Shaw LJ in the 
Court of Appeal decision in Lornrho Ltd v Shell 
Petroleum.23 The more recent decisions in Re Tecnion 
Invesments Ltd24 and North Shore Ventures Limited v 
Anstead Holdings Inc25 developed the contextual 
approach by requiring the court to consider the facts 
of each case in order to determine whether the party 
that was under an obligation to disclose had in fact 
the practical ability, by virtue of its relationship with 
the party in actual possession of the documents, to 
obtain the documents. 
The court concluded in Dirak Asia that the plaintiff did 
in fact have the practical ability to access his online e-
mail account that was provided by his current 
employer and made an order for disclosure. Although 
it was not clear from the facts of this case whether 
the online e-mail account was hosted in mail servers 
within Singapore or beyond her shores, what is clear is 
that this case can now be cited as a precedent for 
compelling the discovery of electronic documents that 
expands beyond the traditional scope of either 
documents that are in the litigant’s actual possession 
or custody (for instance in a notebook or electronic 
device) or that the party has a clear legal right to (for 
instance a personal online e-mail account with Google 
or Yahoo!), so long as the party had the practical 
ability to obtain access to them. 
It has long been a practice that litigants are expected 
to give discovery of their online e-mails, even if these 
are web mail accounts hosted outside jurisdiction. The 
author is aware that the practice within the computer 
forensics community in Singapore at least is that they 
would set up a POP mail account in the litigant’s 
personal computer in order to download the web 
mail. The review and production of e-mails will then 
be conducted utilising this POP mail account. This 
practice has thus far been rationalised because these 
                                                          
23 [1980] 1 QB 358, at [371] and [375] – [376], cited at [21] and [22] 
of Dirak Asia Pte Ltd v Chew Hua Kok [2013] SGHCR 1. 
24 [1985] BCLC 434. 
25 [2012] EWCA Civ 11. 
are the litigant’s personal e-mail. The litigant has, by 
virtue of the terms and conditions that he had agreed 
to when he signed up for the web mail service, the 
legal right to obtain access to copies of these e-mails; 
in other words, they were within his power to obtain. 
With the decision in Dirak Asia, there is every 
possibility that this approach can now be applied to 
an enlarged scope of documents and no longer limited 
to those which the litigant has a legal right to access. 
The practical ability test is potentially wider and may 
lead into unchartered waters. One wonders when 
(and not whether) we will run up against other 
procedural rules that govern cross-border discovery. 
One potential hurdle in cross-border discovery is that 
the export of the discoverable documents from a 
foreign jurisdiction may be contrary to the domestic 
law of that jurisdiction. The experience of other 
countries have often been that the foreign blocking 
statutes are usually in the nature of privacy or data 
protection legislation (for instance in Europe), state 
secrecy laws (for instance, China) and banking secrecy 
laws (for instance, Switzerland). In a pending case 
before the courts in Singapore, a foreign blocking 
statute is now an issue. The case involves a claim by a 
former employee against his former employer. The 
documents involved in the discovery dispute are chat 
messages that the former employer has archived in a 
European country. The former employee has 
requested for discovery of these chat messages. The 
former employer is resisting discovery on the basis 
that it would be exposed to criminal sanctions in that 
European country if it were to disclose those 
messages. A détente was in place at the time this 
article was written, because the parties agreed to 
conduct discovery in stages and defer these 
documents to a subsequent stage. 
In navigating these unchartered waters, we can draw 
on the experience of other common law jurisdictions. 
The common law principle is that orders for the 
discovery of documents are of a procedural nature 
and therefore governed by the law of the foreign 
jurisdiction. It was held in Secretary of State for Health 
v Servier Laboratories Ltd,26 at [99], that: 
… the fact that such orders might, if complied 
with, expose the parties subject to them to 
the risk of prosecution under a foreign law 
provides no defence to their making. The 
English court still retains a jurisdiction under 
                                                          
26 [2013] WLR(D) 401, [2013] EWCA Civ 1234. 
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the lex fori to make them, although it has a 
discretion as to whether to do so in the 
particular circumstances. 
In order to determine whether the discretion ought to 
be exercised, ‘the critical question is the likelihood of 
any prosecution’.27 The assessment of the likelihood 
of prosecution under foreign law relies on the 
evidence of foreign law experts. Cases from the 
United States dealing with foreign blocking statutes 
are legion but do not stray from the common law 
position. US case law is instructive as to the depth of 
analysis that is undertaken in determining the 
likelihood of prosecution. As observed by a 
commentator: 
The general tenor of the decisions by judges 
in the United States indicate that where there 
is an objection to the obtaining of evidence …  
and the objection is made by one of the 
parties, it is more likely that disclosure will be 
ordered, especially when the objections tend 
to be argued in terms of vague principles.28 
One may expect that the likelihood of foreign 
prosecution may be minimised by a carefully crafted 
prayer that takes into account the legality of its 
performance under foreign law. Thus, in the spirit of 
keeping on the right side of data protection laws, one 
of the Sedona Conference’s International Principles of 
Discovery, Disclosure and Data Protection states: 
Preservation or discovery of Protected Data 
should be limited in scope to that which is 
relevant and necessary to support any party’s 
claim or defense in order to minimize conflicts 
of law and impact on the Data Subject.29 
In addition to common law principles, the courts in 
Singapore will have to consider the applicability of 
civil procedure conventions. A list of civil procedure 
conventions may be found in Appendix C to the Rules 
of Court. Additionally, the definition of this term 
includes any convention relating to civil procedure in 
court, which in turn brings into focus the Convention 
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and 
                                                          
27 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd & Ors [2013] 
EWHC 822 (Ch), at [42]. 
28 Stephen Mason, ‘Some international developments in electronic 
evidence’, Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2012, 
Volume 18, Issue 1, 23 – 32, at 28; for a survey of the salient US 
case law, see 23 – 28.  
29 Principle 3, The Sedona Conference International Principles on 
Discovery, Disclosure & Data Protection. 
Commercial Matters (‘the Hague Evidence 
Convention’), to which Singapore has acceded. Under 
the Hague Evidence Convention, evidence may be 
obtained from, and documents inspected during the 
examination of, a person who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of a foreign court pursuant to letters of 
request issued by the Singapore court; or by a 
diplomatic officer or consular agent taking evidence, 
without compulsion, of its own nationals. The Hague 
Evidence Convention obligations are implemented via 
the Evidence (Civil Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) 
Act (Cap 98) and Orders 39 and 66 of the Rules of 
Court.30 Section 4 of the Act empowers the High Court 
to, amongst other things, examine witnesses and 
order the production of documents. Under the Rules 
of Court, Order 39, rule 2 of the Rules of Court, 
provides for the taking of depositions of persons 
outside Singapore, and Order 66 provides for the 
taking of depositions of persons within Singapore for 
foreign courts. The formulation of the order set out in 
Form 75 contemplates that in the process of taking 
depositions by a Singapore consul, the deponent may 
be required to produce documents as well. The 
parallel provision under Order 66, rule 1 for the taking 
of depositions in aid of foreign courts similarly 
provides for the production of documents during the 
deposition. Curiously, Form 74 does not explicitly 
mention that the deponent may be required to 
produce documents when the deposition is taken by a 
foreign judicial authority. 
Two questions come to mind in the consideration of 
the Hague Evidence Convention. First, whether the 
Hague Evidence Convention extends to the discovery 
of documents by themselves, or whether the focus is 
on the examination of witnesses with the production 
of documents ancillary to the deposition. Second, on 
the assumption that the Hague Evidence Convention 
may be used to compel discovery, it is questionable 
whether it is the exclusive mode of obtaining 
discovery from a foreign jurisdiction. 
Article 23 allows a contracting state to exclude pre-
trial discovery when signing, ratifying or acceding to 
the Hague Evidence Convention. It may therefore be 
surmised that the Hague Evidence Convention 
contemplates letters of requests for discovery of 
documents. Against this, however, are judicial 
                                                          
30 See Re Letter of Request from the Court of New South Wales for 
the Prosecution of Peter Bazos (Deposition Proceedings) [1989] 1 
SLR(R) 563; [1989] SGHC 49. Section 6 of the Evidence (Civil 
Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act empowers the making of 
Rules of Court. 
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observations that the EU Evidence Regulation31 (also a 
civil procedure convention for the taking of evidence) 
is intended for taking evidence and that: 
… an order for ordinary disclosure should not 
be equated with taking evidence in another 
State: see Masri v Consolidated Contractors 
International (No 4) [2008] EWCA Civ 876 at 
[45]. As Roth J observed (at [50]), to use 
Regulation 1206/2001 to obtain ordinary 
disclosure ‘would be an extraordinary 
route’.32 
In the enactment of the Hague Evidence Convention 
in the Singapore Evidence (Civil Proceedings in Other 
Jurisdictions) Act, the power of the court (under 
section 4) to order, amongst other things, the 
examination of witnesses and production of 
documents is circumscribed in the following manner: 
(4) An order under this section shall not 
require a person — 
(a) to state what documents relevant 
to the proceedings to which the 
application for the order relates are or 
have been in his possession, custody 
or power; or 
(b) to produce any documents other 
than particular documents specified in 
the order as being documents 
appearing to the High Court to be, or 
to be likely to be, in his possession, 
custody or power. 
The effect of this sub-section is to limit production to 
documents expressly and clearly specified in the order 
for examination and production, but relieving him 
from making general disclosure of other documents 
within his possession, custody or power that may be 
relevant. It would therefore appear that, insofar as 
Singapore is the state which is responding to a letter 
of request, the Hague Evidence Convention has 
limited utility as a means of compelling discovery. To 
resort to the Hague Evidence Convention as a means 
of obtaining discovery of documents in Singapore in 
aid of foreign civil proceedings is therefore a 
potentially awkward and cumbersome exercise, 
                                                          
31 Council Regulation (EF) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on 
cooperation between the courts of the Member State in the taking of 
evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 174, 27.6.2001, pp 1 – 
24. 
32 Secretary of State for Health & Ors v Servier Laboratories Ltd & 
Ors [2013] WLR(D) 401, [2013] EWCA Civ 1234, at [116]. 
requiring precise descriptions of the documents to be 
produced at the deposition. It would require skilful 
examination during the deposition in order to elicit 
information about other relevant documents without 
running afoul of the admonition in section 4(4) of the 
Act. 
Hence, whether civil procedure conventions may be 
invoked for discovery by themselves depends on the 
text of each convention. Even if the civil procedure 
convention permits its use for compelling discovery, 
particularly if that is not their primary purpose, they 
may be a most inefficient mode of obtaining 
discovery. The procedure is cumbersome. In the 
course of a case, there may be multiple requests for 
discovery and each request runs the risk that it may 
be rejected by the foreign court and cause further 
delays.33 Thus, whether this option will lengthen the 
proceedings for which evidence is required is an 
important consideration. 
Even if a civil procedure convention can be invoked 
for discovery of documents located in a foreign 
jurisdiction, it is debatable whether it should be the 
exclusive mode of obtaining discovery. In Secretary of 
State for Health v Servier Laboratories Ltd,34 at [101], 
it was held that a request between courts under the 
EU Evidence Regulation is mandatory only ‘if the 
domestic court wishes to obtain evidence in another 
Member State of a nature that can in practice only be 
obtained with the assistance of that Member State’s 
judicial or other public authorities’. The Court of 
Appeal went on to state, at [112], that: 
… it is important to emphasise that the 
purpose of those procedures is to improve 
and accelerate the procedures for taking 
evidence in another Member State in civil and 
commercial matters. It was aimed at 
increasing and not reducing options in such a 
context and does not, on its face, remove or 
restrict existing forms of proceeding. 
The view expressed holds equal weight with respect 
to the Hague Evidence Convention. Indeed, the US 
Supreme Court had similarly held in Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa35 that the procedures 
provided in the Hague Evidence Convention were of 
                                                          
33 See National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd & Ors 
[2013] EWHC 822 (Ch), at [13]. 
34 [2013] WLR(D) 401, [2013] EWCA Civ 1234. 
35 482 U.S. 522 (107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461). 
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an optional character and did not pre-empt the law of 
the foreign jurisdiction. Hence, the US District Court 
could order a party before it to produce documents 
located in France under its powers in the US Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Thus, we can say with a fair amount of certainty that 
in the absence of express language that clearly pre-
empts the law of the foreign jurisdiction, a party 
seeking discovery has the option of seeking a 
discovery order under common law or proceeding 
under a civil procedure convention. 
Discovery in stages 
A practice that has started to take hold in some of the 
larger disputes involving voluminous documents is to 
conduct discovery in stages. When the e-discovery PD 
was first issued in 2009, the previous iteration of 
paragraph 43B encouraged the parties to ‘collaborate 
in good faith and agree on issues relating to the 
discovery and inspection of electronically stored 
documents, including … the giving of discovery in 
stages according to an agreed chronology’. This 
exhortation was retained and expanded upon during 
the 2012 revision, and paragraph 45 of the e-
discovery PD now reads: 
(1) Within two weeks after the close of 
pleadings, parties are encouraged to 
collaborate in good faith and agree on issues 
relating to the discovery and inspection of 
electronically stored documents. Such issues 
may include the scope and/or any limits on 
documents to be given in discovery, whether 
parties are prepared to make voluntary 
disclosures, whether specific documents or 
class of documents ought to be specifically 
preserved, search terms to be used in 
reasonable searches, whether preliminary 
searches and/or data sampling are to be 
conducted and the giving of discovery in 
stages according to an agreed schedule, as 
well as the format and manner in which 
copies of discoverable documents shall be 
supplied. Parties are encouraged to have 
regard to the list of issues at Appendix E Part 
1 (Check list of issues for good faith 
collaboration) in their discussions. Parties 
should exchange their checklists prior to 
commencing good faith discussions. 
The objectives and practical utility of this approach is 
famously articulated in Goodale v The Ministry of 
Justice,36 at para 22, and bears repeating: 
In terms of a search one should always start 
with the most important people at the top of 
the pyramid, that is, adopt a staged or 
incremental approach. Very often an opposing 
party will get everything they want from that 
without having to go down the pyramid any 
further, often into duplicate material. 
The approach that the Singapore courts have adopted 
in managing the conduct of discovery in stages is 
outlined in Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG.37 First, 
identify from amongst the main witnesses to the 
dispute those who are likely to be the custodians of 
repositories holding relevant documents. Next, 
identify from the potential repositories within their 
possession, custody or power those that are likely to 
produce relevant electronic documents. Through this 
exercise, litigants would have drawn up a short list of 
significant witnesses who hold most of the electronic 
documents. The parties can then decide whether 
discoverable documents should be identified through 
the traditional ocular review or by using a search tool 
and pertinent search terms. The discoverable 
documents thus identified will then be disclosed and 
copies provided to other parties in the case. This is the 
first stage. I had observed in Breezeway, at [15], that: 
… in conducting discovery in stages, it is open 
to parties to proceed with a subsequent stage 
involving other custodians and repositories 
after the conclusion of the initial stage. 
Subsequent stages will be conducted in the 
same manner as the initial stage: 
identification of additional custodians and 
repositories, drawing up search terms and 
agreeing on the limits for reasonable 
searches, etc. In the limited experience of this 
court, a subsequent stage has not been 
necessary in any case thus far. However, that 
is very different from saying that subsequent 
stages will never be necessary. In any event, 
parties may always make an application for 
specific discovery under O 24, r 5 based on 
documents disclosed in the initial stage of 
discovery. 
                                                          
36 [2009] EWHC B41 (QB). 
37 [2012] SGHC 41. 
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The experience of the past five years has been that 
the number of major witnesses who have been 
identified as custodians for the first stage has usually 
been small, between six and eight. As a testimony to 
the accuracy of the prescient passage in Goodale cited 
above, parties in almost all cases have not had to 
proceed onto a subsequent stage for general 
discovery. The experience affirms the prediction that 
most of the documents that are necessary for 
disclosure, at least for general discovery, would have 
been disclosed in the first stage. The parties can and 
do proceed to make specific discovery requests for 
what are traditionally referred to as train-of-inquiry 
documents arising from the review of documents 
disclosed during general discovery. 
Conducting discovery in stages also has the added 
benefit of controlling the costs of discovery. In a 
pending case arising from the failure of a joint venture 
company that had its base of operations, and hence 
where most of the documents are kept, in a 
neighbouring country, the joint venture partners were 
able to retrieve and repatriate some 30 terabytes of 
electronic data and 660 boxes of documents. Faced 
with this electronic and paper mountain, the parties 
resorted to conducting discovery in stages in order to 
control costs and focus resources on the repositories 
that are most likely to yield relevant documents. Even 
so, the cost of conducting searches on the electronic 
repositories was significant and is on-going at the time 
of writing. 
Discovery accuracy 
The area which has generated, by far, the most 
judicial discussion is the use of search terms and 
whether the party producing the documents ought to 
be permitted to review the search results before 
handing over the responsive documents. In today’s 
information driven society, the amount of information 
that is potentially discoverable can be overwhelming. 
The Singapore courts have endorsed the use of 
technology as a means to control the burgeoning 
mountain of electronic documents. Judicial 
pronouncements have made it clear that the use of 
search technology is intended to assist parties to 
strike a balance between identifying a corpus of 
relevant electronic documents and avoiding incurring 
a disproportionate amount of legal costs. In Sanae 
Achar v Sci-Gen Ltd,38 at [13] – [14], this sentiment 
was articulated in the following manner: 
13. With technology fuelling an 
unprecedented explosion of the volume of 
discoverable documents and the ease of their 
duplication, it is not surprising that the 
traditional manner in which discovery has 
been carried out is proving increasingly 
inefficient in achieving the purposes for which 
the discovery process was developed. … 
14. One way to cope with the burgeoning 
volume of discoverable documents is to rely 
on technology itself. Technology has thrown 
up countless tools which make editing, 
copying, reviewing and searching through the 
textual content of documents considerably 
less cumbersome than before. For example, 
parties need not manually trawl through 
heaps of printed documents in order to 
identify relevant documents and weed out 
irrelevant ones. Running simple keyword 
searches using easy-to-use desktop search 
engines would suffice. It is also easier to 
manage and organise electronically stored 
documents, especially where printed copies of 
such documents run into tomes and cartons. 
The e-Discovery PD recognises the 
tremendous potential of technology in 
modernising the discovery process. Thus, it 
encourages the exchange and supply of copies 
of discoverable electronic documents in soft 
copy by creating a framework for the 
inspection and discovery of electronically 
stored documents within boundaries 
established by existing legal principles. … 
The courts do not endorse any particular technology 
but adopts an open-door policy while encouraging 
practitioners to adopt suitable litigation technology in 
pursuit of the ultimate goal of achieving efficiency in 
the civil litigation process and thereby managing 
litigation costs. These sentiments were expressed in 
Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd 
and another suit,39 at [41]: 
In the interests of promoting efficiency in civil 
procedure, our courts do embrace and 
encourage the adoption of modern search 
                                                          
38 [2011] 3 SLR 967; [2011] SGHC 87. 
39 [2013] 3 SLR 758; [2013] SGHC 111. 
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technologies and document review and 
management tools. Our courts adopt a 
technology-neutral approach, showing no 
preference for any particular type of search 
technology or document review and 
management tool. However, the march of 
technology means that there are and will be 
better tools available for use by lawyers or 
litigation support professionals in the future. 
Indubitably, the law and practice will evolve in 
tandem with such developments to refine and 
improve our discovery process so that it 
remains a force for justice and not injustice. 
The adversarial system will play its role in 
ensuring that advocates adopt trustworthy 
technology. As technology evolves to perform 
more efficiently and accurately, litigants will 
benefit from them. The courts have 
encouraged lawyers to harness search 
technologies and document review and 
management tools to bring efficiency to civil 
litigation practice, especially during discovery: 
these tools increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of lawyers and, if used adroitly, 
will lower the costs of litigation, not only 
during discovery but downstream as well, eg, 
during the preparation of affidavits of 
evidence-in-chief and witness preparation for 
trial. 
The use of technology to identify documents for 
review can be overly inclusive and produce a 
disproportionately large number of potential 
document. What is clear is the repeated reminder that 
an overly thorough review of all documents, and 
indeed all documents that are responsive to the 
search terms, may not be suitable in all cases. The 
principle of proportionality steers us away from a 
leave-no-stone-unturned approach in civil litigation in 
all but the most deserving cases. It has been observed 
in Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG,40 at [20], that: 
The perennial tension in the law of civil 
procedure, viz, the attempt to achieve both 
justice and efficiency, comes to the forefront 
in the discovery process. On the one hand, it 
is ex hypothesi in the interest of justice that all 
relevant material is discovered, while on the 
other, there is a pressing need to ensure 
efficiency lest injustice be occasioned through 
                                                          
40 [2012] 4 SLR 1035; [2012] SGHC 170. 
the well-meaning but disproportionate 
attempt to ensure that all relevant material is 
disclosed. 
Similarly, in Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia 
Directories Pte Ltd and another suit,41 at [34], it was 
observed that: 
The interests of efficiency requires that a case 
gets to trial as soon as possible with the best 
set of documents that can be amassed to 
assist in arriving at a decision on the merits. 
Commercial entities look for finality as it 
brings an end to disputes and, win or lose, 
they can put the dispute behind them, write 
off bad debts and get on with their business. 
Efficiency seeks to cull the volume of 
documents to be disclosed and it employs the 
scythe of proportionality and economy. The 
ultimate goal is to ensure that burgeoning 
volumes of discoverable documents do not 
translate into burgeoning legal costs that may 
prevent all but those litigants with the 
deepest pockets from seeing their cases tried 
on the merits. The Holy Grail is to arrive at a 
set of documents of the right size containing 
all relevant documents without expenditure 
of disproportionate costs. 
In Nichia Corporation v Argos Ltd,42 at [50] – [51], 
Jacob LJ had famously cautioned that searching for 
perfect justice in every case by adopting a leave-no-
stone-unturned approach would actually defeat 
justice. He articulated the ills of burgeoning legal 
costs, at [46] – [47], in the following manner: 
46. … It is wrong just to disclose a mass of 
background documents which do not really 
take the case one way or another. And there 
is a real vice in doing so: it compels the mass 
reading by the lawyers on the other side, and 
is followed usually by the importation of the 
documents into the whole case thereafter – 
hence trial bundles most of which are never 
looked at. 
47. Now it might be suggested that it is 
cheaper to make this sort of mass disclosure 
than to consider the documents with some 
care to decide whether they should be 
disclosed. And at that stage it might be 
                                                          
41 [2013] 3 SLR 758; [2013] SGHC 111. 
42 [2007] Bus LR 1753; [2007] EWCA Civ 741. 
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cheaper – just run it all through the 
photocopier or CD maker-especially since 
doing so is an allowable cost. But that is not 
the point. For it is the downstream costs 
caused by over-disclosure which so often are 
so substantial and so pointless. It can even be 
said, in cases of massive over-disclosure, that 
there is a real risk that the really important 
documents will get overlooked – where does 
a wise man hide a leaf? 
The case law dealing with search terms are clustered 
around the following topics: how to compose 
appropriate search terms to ensure that the search 
results will contain more documents with a high 
degree of relevance; and whether the party giving 
discovery should incur the costs of reviewing the 
search results in order to remove irrelevant 
documents before turning the set of documents over. 
The use of search technology during discovery 
Search technology may be used to assist with 
identifying documents for discovery at several 
junctures. It may be used by a party to identify that 
corpus of documents that he wishes to disclose. In 
this instance, the use of search technology and the 
crafting of search terms is a set of activities that the 
party undertakes wholly internally in consultation 
with his counsel. Often, the use of search technology 
in this sense is opaque to the adversary, as he may 
never be informed of its use. The e-discovery PD does 
not seek to regulate this practice and parties are left 
to their own (storage) devices (pun intended). 
Another juncture at which search technology may be 
explored is when the parties are to embark on general 
discovery. Instead of each party going away to identify 
discoverable documents on their own, the e-discovery 
PD provides a framework within which the parties can 
work collaboratively to draw up an e-discovery plan 
that includes an agreed set of search terms that each 
party will run on its repositories. The e-discovery PD 
encourages parties to collaborate in good faith in 
order to agree on how general discovery is to be 
carried out. In order to do so, it provides a checklist 
that each party is to go through and subsequently 
exchange. Going through the checklist will ensure that 
each party addresses its mind to pertinent issues that 
impinge on the number of custodians and repositories 
that should be included within the scope of general 
discovery, whether search technology ought to be 
used, how electronic documents should be 
exchanged, and such like. Once the checklist is 
completed, the parties are to exchange them. This 
exchange of information is designed to promote 
discussion and collaboration. 
The e-discovery PD also provides a template e-
discovery plan that the parties can use as a basis for 
their discussion, amending it in accordance to the 
requirements of each case. The provision of a neutral 
document is intended to have the effect of promoting 
collaboration and assisting the parties in their search 
of a middle ground when deciding how general 
discovery is to be carried out. The e-discovery plan 
provides a means for both parties to come to an 
agreement as to the search terms that each party will 
use on the repositories that each has identified. So 
instead of each party undertaking its own search, the 
e-discovery plan reinforces the cards-on-the-table 
approach in civil litigation by allowing the parties to 
agree on what and how much to disclose. 
A third juncture where search technology may be 
used is during what is referred to as the specific 
discovery stage. This is the stage following general 
discovery when, having reviewed the documents 
disclosed, each party is able to make requests either 
for the furnishing of a further and better list for the 
reason that certain classes of documents which ought 
to have been disclosed had been omitted, or to make 
requests for disclosure of specific documents or 
classes of documents that will enable the requesting 
party to pursue a line of inquiry leading to other 
relevant documents. In either scenario, the e-
discovery PD provides the framework for using search 
terms as a new way of describing a class of 
documents. It sets out the minimum set of limits that 
each request must include: limits as to the custodians 
and/or repositories, and limits as to time periods. This 
comports with the trite principle that one is not 
permitted to embark on a fishing expedition during 
discovery in an attempt to empty out your adversary’s 
filing cabinets, literal or virtual. 
The use of search technology 
It should be noted that the e-discovery PD does not 
mandate the use of search technology in every case 
that it is invoked. It is open to the parties to come to 
an agreement on how to identify discoverable 
electronic documents and to adopt an e-discovery PD 
for disclosure, inspection and supply of copies. Each 
party is left to determine the most efficient and 
effective method of identifying discoverable 
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electronic documents in their possession: it may 
involve the use of search technology or it may rely on 
its employees to identify them. Indeed, the e-
discovery PD provides for a standard set of orders to 
facilitate this: paragraph 53. When these set of 
template orders are prayed for, ‘nothing in this 
paragraph requires parties to agree to adopt an 
electronic discovery plan or conduct reasonable 
searches for electronically stored documents under 
this Part.’43 The giving of discovery by the supply of 
soft copies with inspection deferred – frequently 
referred to as ‘discovery by soft-copy exchange’ as a 
shorthand – has been adopted in an increasing 
number of cases, particularly those where the lawyers 
who are running discovery are more technology 
knowledgeable (and frequently, though not 
exclusively, from the younger set). 
Perhaps the only instance where the use of search 
technology is mandated is when compound 
documents are the subject matter of discovery: 
Surface Stone v Tay Seng Leon.44 Compound 
documents are documents that contain other 
documents, for example, a hard disk contains within it 
innumerable discrete electronic documents; similarly, 
a database will contain a plethora of records. The 
interest to be protected and the danger to be held at 
bay is the unfettered trawling of what is essentially a 
virtual filing cabinet. The compound document will in 
many cases certainly contain both relevant and 
irrelevant documents. The e-discovery PD picks up 
where Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P45 
left off by providing for a template inspection protocol 
that is designed to ensure that trawling is prevented 
and the confidential and privileged documents are 
safeguarded from disclosure. Surface Stone made it a 
clear requirement that search terms will have to be 
used to ensure that the party seeking discovery is 
focused in its request. 
Post-search review for relevance 
One of the earlier judicial pronouncement in this area 
may be found in the case of Sanae Achar v Sci-Gen 
Ltd,46 where it was held that – in the context where 
search terms had been used, either by agreement or 
ordered by the court, to describe the classes of 
                                                          
43 Para 53(3), e-discovery PD. 
44 [2011] SGHC 223. 
45 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 343; [2007] SGHC 133. 
46 [2011] 3 SLR 967; [2011] SGHC 87. 
discoverable documents – the party giving discovery 
would have fulfilled its obligations by carrying out the 
search as agreed or ordered and turning over all 
documents in the search result. The party entitled to 
discovery will have to accept the set of search result 
as fulfilment of its request. The court went on further 
to state that the party giving discovery shall not be 
required to review the search result of relevance, at 
[23]: 
Having explained the basis for ordering 
discovery of the Category 1, 2, and 3 
Documents, I briefly turn to the extent of 
Achar’s and Sci-Gen’s obligations. Pursuant to 
my discovery order, Achar must, inter alia, 
disclose the documents specified in the order, 
carry out a search to the extent stated in the 
order, and disclose any documents located as 
a result of that search. So long as Achar has 
complied with the terms of that order, as well 
as all the necessary requirements stated in 
the Rules of Court, Sci-Gen would have to 
accept that Achar had fulfilled her discovery 
obligations, notwithstanding the fact that 
there could well be emails not caught by the 
search engine employed. 
It should be noted from the outset that there is a 
distinction to be drawn between a post-search review 
for documents that are privileged from disclosure and 
a post-search review for ensuring that all documents 
in the search results are relevant. The e-discovery PD 
had from its first version provided for a stage in the 
disclosure process where the party giving discovery 
would be permitted to review the search result for the 
purpose of identifying documents that it asserts to be 
privileged from disclosure. Paragraph 47(6) of the e-
discovery PD provides that: 
Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the 
party giving discovery from reviewing the 
discoverable electronically stored documents 
or the results of any reasonable search for the 
purpose of identifying privileged documents. 
There has also been judicial observation that this 
privilege review can also be carried out using suitable 
search terms. In Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG,47 I 
had observed, at [37], that: 
Although the search results are deemed to be 
relevant and no further review for relevance 
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is necessary, time was allocated for UBS to 
conduct a review for documents and emails in 
the search results which may potentially be 
privileged … In this privilege review process, 
search terms can also be used effectively in 
order to identify privileged or confidential 
information. For example, using the email 
address of external counsel to identify 
privileged documents … 
What was ground breaking in the decision in Sanae 
Achar is that fact that the party giving discovery need 
not review the search results for relevance. It is 
therefore not be surprising that the judicial 
pronouncement in this case was received with some 
degree of reservation. 
The significance of Sanae Achar is that it provided 
litigants with an additional option of using search 
technology as a means to control discovery costs. 
Lawyers are by nature and training cautious and 
prefer not to disclose a document that they have not 
had an opportunity to consider. The traditional mode 
of reviewing each discoverable document provides 
some level of comfort that, notwithstanding that a 
team of lawyers of varying degree of experience had 
been deployed in the process, a legal eye had 
traversed the document and a legal mind had been 
applied to the question of its disclosure. But this is an 
expensive process, in both time as well as costs. With 
the burgeoning volumes of potentially discoverable 
documents and the costs involved, this is not an 
option that ought to be adopted as a mechanistic 
routine in every case. Sanae Achar made available the 
option of wholly relying on the search technology and 
search terms as a proxy for relevance. 
The court had a subsequent occasion to explain that 
the fact that one’s obligation has been discharged 
after carrying out the search as agreed or ordered 
does not mean that every document in the search 
result is deemed to be relevant. In the appellate 
decision of Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG,48 the 
court observed at [30] – [33] that: 
30. The upshot of the above observations is 
that the concept of “prima facie relevance” 
refers to the notion that the party giving 
discovery is not required to review the search 
results of the court-sanctioned search for 
relevance. The search results of the court-
sanctioned search are ‘prima facie relevant’ in 
                                                          
48 [2012] 4 SLR 1035; [2012] SGHC 170 
the sense that the party giving discovery will 
be deemed to have complied with his 
obligation to provide all relevant documents 
under the general discovery process (see O 24 
r 1 of the Rules of Court). 
31. In this regard, one should be keenly aware 
of the conceptual distinction between the 
obligation to give discovery and the concept 
of relevance in the context of discovery. 
Although both concepts are related because 
the party giving discovery has the obligation 
to give discovery of all relevant material, the 
e-discovery PD makes it possible for that party 
to fulfil his discovery obligations by giving 
discovery of the results of a court[-
]sanctioned search, regardless of whether 
such search results are over or under-inclusive 
vis-à-vis the identification of relevant 
material. 
32. With regard to the obligation to give 
discovery, as long as the party giving discovery 
complies with the terms of the court-
sanctioned search, as well as with all the 
necessary requirements as stated in the Rules 
of Court, the party entitled to discovery 
‘would have to accept that [the party giving 
discovery] had fulfilled [his or] her discovery 
obligations, notwithstanding the fact that 
there could well be [documents] not caught 
by the search engine employed’ (Sanae Achar 
([19] supra) at [23]; and see [30] above). This 
is because the discovery rules do not require 
that no stone should be left unturned – an 
attitude “justified by considerations of 
proportionality” (Sanae Achar at [23], citing 
Digicel (St Lucia) Ltd v Cable & Wireless Plc 
[2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch) at [46]). 
33. However, the fact that the obligation to 
give discovery is fulfilled by the party giving 
discovery of the results of a court-sanctioned 
search does not mean that the results of the 
search are deemed relevant in the sense that 
the party giving discovery is not entitled to 
conduct post court-sanctioned search 
reviews. At bottom, the e-discovery PD is 
designed to keep costs proportionate, 
relieving the party giving discovery of the 
need to conduct costly and time-consuming 
ocular review of all the documents in his 
possession, custody or power (see [22] 
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above). The e-discovery PD was not intended 
to prevent the party giving discovery from 
undertaking a post court-sanctioned search 
review to remove documents that are 
irrelevant to the issues in dispute. But any 
such further review would be outside the 
ambit of the e-discovery PD and the decision 
to remove any document on the ground of 
irrelevance must be done by way of ocular 
review. This means that every document a 
party removes in a post court-sanctioned 
search review on the basis that it is irrelevant 
must be processed in the traditional manner, 
ie, manually examined and subsequently 
considered irrelevant by a solicitor familiar 
with the issues in dispute (or the party, in the 
case of a litigant in person). …  
Drawing this distinction between obligation and 
relevance means that the court will accommodate a 
certain degree of latitude and forbearance when 
search technology is used. No issue arises if some 
documents are responsive to the search terms but are 
factually irrelevant. The obligation to disclose is 
discharged and the false positive in the search result 
can be easily ignored subsequently. This approach is 
consonant with the courts’ policy of endorsing the use 
of search technology as a means of striking a balance 
between the volume of documents that have to be 
disclosed and in ensuring that the legal costs incurred 
during discovery is proportionate. Henceforth, parties 
have the option of relying wholly on search 
technology as a proxy for relevance and thus will not 
have to incur the additional costs of reviewing the 
search results for relevance before disclosure, or they 
may choose to do so. Which path one takes will 
depend very much on what is the proportionate 
measure for the case. 
The next matter is to determine when it is appropriate 
to review search results for relevance. In Robin Duane 
Littau v Astrata (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd,49 the court had 
set the tone that a further post-search review for 
relevance will usually be unnecessary, having in mind 
the costs that are likely to be incurred. The courts had 
laid down a clear marker by reference to whether the 
costs incurred in such a review has been reasonably 
incurred in Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG,50 at 
[30]: 
                                                          
49 [2011] SGHC 61. 
50 [2012] 4 SLR 1035; [2012] SGHC 170. 
… As this process is usually an expense 
unreasonably incurred the party electing to 
do this will not generally be entitled to 
recover the costs of the post court-sanctioned 
search review in the event that costs are 
eventually awarded in his favour. 
It can thus be surmised that the additional cost of the 
post-search review for relevance will be an important 
consideration. One should say that the determination 
of whether the costs of a post-search review ought to 
be incurred should take into consideration issues like 
the volume of documents that will have to be 
reviewed within the overall context of what is 
proportionate for the case, having in mind the value 
of the claim and the issues involved. 
While the court in Sanae Achar made it clear that the 
party that had made the request for discovery using 
search terms is obliged to take the search result in 
toto, without requiring a further review for relevance, 
the court in Breezeway made it clear that it is the 
party disclosing the document that has the choice 
whether to conduct a post-search review for 
relevance. It can disclose the search results without a 
further review for relevance, but if it chooses to 
conduct a post-search relevance review, then the 
onus fell on it to demonstrate that documents that 
have been removed are indeed irrelevant. Further, 
the court opined that the costs incurred during the 
post-search review will generally be considered to 
have been unreasonably incurred and are likely not to 
be allowed. This effectively shifts the burden onto the 
party giving discovery to demonstrate that the costs 
of the post-search review were reasonably incurred, 
possibly by reference to the issues at stake. This 
shifting of burden accords with the overall tone that 
the courts have consistently set, that the focus should 
be on crafting more accurate search terms before the 
search is conducted, and for a high degree of 
tolerance of false positives in the search results. 
Hence, the party that had requested the documents 
ought to take the search results in toto; and the party 
giving discovery carries the burden of justifying its 
actions and runs the risk that it cannot recover its 
costs if it chooses to conduct a post-search review for 
relevance. 
Crafting search terms 
The crafting of search terms is the other topic around 
which case law are clustered in these early days of e-
discovery procedural developments. One ought to 
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commence a discussion on this topic with a 
consideration of the distinction between search terms 
and keywords. While they may often be used 
interchangeably to refer to the words that is used by 
the search engine in order to perform the search, that 
is probably more accurately the function of keywords. 
A search term combines keywords with search 
operators, for example confining search results to 
documents where two keywords appear within a close 
proximity with each other, or requiring that search 
results to include only cases where two or more 
keywords appear in the precise sequence. 
There are a number of earlier decisions that dealt with 
the mechanics and details of crafting search terms. 
However, it was in the more recent case of Global 
Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd and 
another suit,51 at [53], that the court articulated the 
guiding principle in the crafting of search terms: 
Where the keywords in issue are those which 
are proposed by the party seeking discovery, 
it will generally be unnecessary to be 
concerned about false negatives …  in general 
the only concerns will be in relation to the 
probability of false positives and the likely 
number of false positives. 
Put in this way, the role of the court is to assist parties 
in crafting search terms that will reduce false 
negatives (that is, relevant documents that do not 
show up in the search results) and false positives 
(where irrelevant documents that turn up in the 
search results). The court introduced the concept of 
accuracy to describe this objective, and eschewed any 
assumption that the search results are relevant, 
whether as a matter of fact or presumption. 
What is clear from the cases that will be examined in 
this section is that the courts do not endorse the 
adoption of search terms that will trawl through 
parties’ repositories in order to bring up a large 
number of documents and to thereafter rely on a 
post-search ocular review in order to discard the 
irrelevant. This is not how the courts expect parties to 
use search technology. The rationale is immediately 
obvious: the costs of conducting the search is added 
to the costs of a full review of the search results and 
will probably increase costs; see also Jacob LJ’s 
admonition in Nichia Corporation v Argos Ltd cited 
above. This is concordant with judicial sentiments 
                                                          
51 [2013] 3 SLR 758. 
expressed in Global Yellow Pages52 and Breezeway53 
that the courts’ view is that technology ought to be 
used to manage the volume – and hence the costs – 
of discovery and that the leave-no-stone-unturned 
approach ought not to be adopted mechanistically in 
every case. 
The courts envisage a more strategic and considered 
approach in the use of technology to assist with 
discovery. That a case requires the use of search 
technology to assist with discovery usually means that 
the volume of electronic documents is significant. 
Search terms ought to be crafted in a manner that 
produces a set of search results that minimises false 
positives. The risk of false negatives is more 
theoretical than real: the experience of the past 
quinquennium has been that more than half of the 
search terms initially proposed are likely to yield no 
results during the preliminary search. This fortifies the 
court’s observation of human tendencies when it 
noted in Global Yellow Pages that false negatives will 
generally not be an issue that will be of concern in 
contested applications. 
There is some guidance in the fashioning of search 
terms in order to achieve a high degree of accuracy in 
the search results. I had observed in Breezeway 
Overseas Ltd v UBS AG,54 at [25], that: 
In selecting keywords and formulating search 
terms, we ought to guard against the 
tendency to cast as wide a net as we can in 
                                                          
52 Global Yellow Pages Ltd v Promedia Directories Pte Ltd and 
another suit [2013] 3 SLR 758; [2013] SGHC 111, at [34]: ‘Efficiency 
seeks to cull the volume of documents to be disclosed and it 
employs the scythe of proportionality and economy. The ultimate 
goal is to ensure that burgeoning volumes of discoverable 
documents do not translate into burgeoning legal costs that may 
prevent all but those litigants with the deepest pockets from seeing 
their cases tried on the merits. The Holy Grail is to arrive at a set of 
documents of the right size containing all relevant documents 
without expenditure of disproportionate costs.’ 
53 Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG [2012] 4 SLR 1035; [2012] 
SGHC 170, at [20]: ‘The perennial tension in the law of civil 
procedure, viz, the attempt to achieve both justice and efficiency, 
comes to the forefront in the discovery process. On the one hand, it 
is ex hypothesi in the interest of justice that all relevant material is 
discovered, while on the other, there is a pressing need to ensure 
efficiency lest injustice be occasioned through the well-meaning but 
disproportionate attempt to ensure that all relevant material is 
disclosed’; and at [21]: ‘The proliferation of information technology 
has resulted in a burgeoning volume of discoverable electronic 
documents, causing a plethora of problems for the traditional 
discovery framework … The traditional discovery method of 
manually reviewing every document (‘ocular review’) pits the ability 
of humans to review documents against the ability of machines to 
produce them. It is a war lost unless we can harness the ability of 
the same machines to review them.’ 
54 [2012] SGHC 41. 
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order to obtain the highest number of 
documents in the search results. This has 
emerged as a pattern of behaviour in certain 
types of cases, where the party seeking 
discovery tries to use searches to draw out as 
many documents as possible from his 
adversary, with the hope that he may find the 
proverbial smoking gun. That would, to my 
mind, be tantamount to trawling or the 
emptying out of the adversary’s filing cabinets 
while hiding behind the mask of search terms. 
The collected experience extracted from case law that 
have espoused on the intricacies and considerations 
in the shaping of search terms may be summarised 
thus. First, and perhaps most obviously, search terms 
have to be formulated with reference to the pleadings 
which demarcate the issues that are in the arena of 
dispute.55 This is an intensely tedious and fact-based 
exercise requiring an appreciation of the facts and not 
merely the legal issues. For in the selection of 
keywords, the courts in Singapore have espoused a 
preference for keywords that are of a more specific 
nature. These are preferred over those that are 
broader, as the approach that the courts have 
adopted is to make use of search technology to 
identify as accurate, and hence as pithy and compact, 
a set of documents as possible before these are 
turned over for ocular review. As noted above, it is 
not the intention for search terms to be used to 
obtain a surfeit of over-inclusive documents and 
thereafter rely on costly legal review to filter the 
relevant documents. Examples of keywords that have 
been considered to be sufficiently specific that they 
fall within this category are bank account and file 
reference numbers, project names, e-mail addresses, 
telephone numbers, and names and initials of 
persons.56 As can be surmised, this requires that the 
interlocutors engage in their discussions with 
knowledge of the factual and legal issues of the case 
in sufficient depth. It is pointless to engage in 
discussions otherwise. 
Often, a consideration of the pleadings will yield other 
keywords that are unique or peculiar to the case. 
Examples of such keywords are product names and 
terms, abbreviations or phrases unique to the industry 
or the parties.57 What ought to be avoided as far as 
                                                          
55 Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG [2012] SGHC 41, at [31]. 
56 Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG [2012] SGHC 41, at [28]. 
57 Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG [2012] SGHC 41, at [29]. 
possible are common words that occur in daily use, 
whether generally, within the industry or between the 
parties. This is advisedly so as the objectives of 
achieving a greater degree of accuracy and cost 
efficiency in legal review are not achieved when a 
surfeit of false positives appear in the search results.58 
It is in this context that one appreciates that legal 
terms are usually quite ineffective as keywords, 
because factual witnesses almost never use legal 
terms in their correspondence.59 Finally, keywords 
which can occur as a component of common words 
should similarly be avoided unless the search engine is 
capable of identifying their occurrence as a discrete 
word and not as part of the word.60 
Preliminary searches 
If, after adhering to these admonitions, the 
adversaries are yet unable to agree on the selection of 
keywords and the composition of search terms, there 
is now the entrenched practice that a preliminary 
search is conducted using all the disputed search 
terms before parties make their submissions. This 
practice was set out early on in my decision in Robin 
Duane Littau v Astrata (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd,61 at [19] – 
[21], and its rationale is simply stated: 
Preliminary keyword search to aid in 
determining relevance of disputed keywords 
19. … To facilitate parties’ submissions and 
assist the court in determining whether any 
particular keyword was relevant, the 
defendant was permitted to run a preliminary 
search against the forensic images of the 
seized items using the list of keywords that it 
had proposed. However, this preliminary 
search was intended solely for the purpose of 
identifying the number of hits – ie instances of 
documents which corresponded to the 
keyword – and the defendant was not 
permitted to view any of the documents 
forming the search results. 
20. As it turned out, after performing this 
preliminary search using the defendant’s 
proposed list of 251 keywords, parties were 
                                                          
58 Robin Duane Littau v Astrata (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 
61, at [21]. 
59 Breezeway Overseas Ltd v UBS AG [2012] SGHC 41, at [30]. 
60 Robin Duane Littau v Astrata (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 
61, at [25] & [26]. 
61 [2011] SGHC 61 
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able to agree to abandon keywords which 
returned no hits — and the defendant also 
withdrew two additional keywords — leaving 
only 92 disputed keywords on which a ruling 
was required. During submissions on 12 
January 2011, the preliminary [sic] also 
provided much assistance, particularly when 
refining the disputed keywords and 
determining the search conditions which 
ought to be attached to the keywords when 
the search is eventually performed. In the 
present case, the preliminary search was 
conducted at a cost of only $500 to the 
defendant, who had volunteered to bear this 
cost. Given its relatively low cost and 
usefulness during arguments before me, I 
think that this practice of performing a 
preliminary search using disputed keywords in 
order to identify the number of hits should, so 
far as practicable, be adopted in all cases 
where keywords are disputed. This will help to 
identify red herrings (ie keywords which yield 
no hits) and assist parties to refine search 
conditions or the keywords proper, whether 
as part of negotiations or during arguments 
before the court. 
21. … the availability of the preliminary search 
(see above, paragraph 19) proved to be very 
helpful in determining whether a particular 
keyword should be permitted or how it should 
be modified or constrained. I must emphasise 
that the number of hits returned in the 
preliminary search results does not have any 
bearing on relevance. However, they were 
helpful in determining whether a particular 
keyword was unsuitable as too many hits had 
been returned thereby highlighting those 
keywords which needed to be refined or 
restricted, after relevance had been 
determined. 
Experience has shown that the earlier this preliminary 
search is run using the disputed search terms, the 
sooner the over- or under-inclusive search terms are 
eliminated or refined. Without looking at the contents 
of the search results, a consideration of the number of 
hits returned by each search term will quickly 
eliminate those with no results and those with a 
surfeit of results. For the latter category, the focus can 
then be quickly trained on how to refine the search 
term. As for the search terms that throw up a 
reasonably manageable set of results, parties have 
usually been able to adopt a sensible approach, 
without the need for overly prolix or contentious 
submissions. This practice is now de rigeur and the 
parties will be in possession of the results of 
preliminary searches as they enter into the registrar’s 
chambers to commence their submissions on an 
application over disputed search terms.  
Solicitors’ obligations in performing searches 
Lest the reader departs thinking that the shaping of 
search terms is all there is to using search technology, 
that is unfortunately not the case. Solicitors owe a 
duty to their clients and to the court to ensure that 
discovery is properly conducted. The extent of this 
duty was considered by the Court of Appeal in Teo 
Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial and 
another appeal.62 ‘The responsibility for ensuring 
proper discovery falls not only on the litigant but on 
his lawyers as well.’63 Solicitors not only had to ensure 
that clients understand the full extent of their 
obligations to disclose relevant documents, ‘[t]hey 
also owe a duty of involvement in and supervision of 
the disclosure process.’64 This is a duty that solicitors 
owed to the court and ‘it remains incumbent on 
solicitors, in good conscience, to act in diligent 
compliance with it … Should the solicitor find that he 
is unable to obtain his client’s co-operation in this 
respect, he must cease to act for that client’.65 The 
practical effect of this is explained in the passages 
below: 
45. What then are the practical applications of 
this duty of the solicitor? Lord Atkin explained 
it thus in Myers v Elman [at 304]: 
He is at an early stage of the 
proceedings engaged in putting 
before the Court on the oath of his 
client information which may afford 
evidence at the trial. Obviously he 
must explain to his client what is the 
meaning of relevance: and equally 
obviously he must not necessarily be 
satisfied by the statement of his client 
                                                          
62 [2013] 3 SLR 573; [2013] SGCA 33. 
63 Teo Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial and another 
appeal [2013] 3 SLR 573; [2013] SGCA 33, at [43]. 
64 Teo Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial and another 
appeal [2013] 3 SLR 573; [2013] SGCA 33, at [43]. 
65 Teo Wai Cheong v Crédit Industriel et Commercial and another 
appeal [2013] 3 SLR 573; [2013] SGCA 33, at [44]. 
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that he has no documents or no more 
than he chooses to disclose. If he has 
reasonable ground for supposing that 
there are others, he must investigate 
the matter; but he need not go 
beyond taking reasonable steps to 
ascertain the truth. He is not the 
ultimate judge, and if he reasonably 
decides to believe his client, criticism 
cannot be directed to him. [Emphasis 
added] 
47. … In Woods v Martins Bank Ltd [1959] 1 
QB 55 at 60, Salmon J held that a solicitor is 
duty bound, as an officer of the court, to 
carefully go through the documents disclosed 
by the client in order to ensure that, as far as 
possible, no relevant documents have been 
omitted. We accept that this may have to be 
tempered in appropriate cases, particularly 
where the volume of electronic or other 
documents might necessitate some degree of 
considered, informed and adequately 
supervised delegation. … Moreover, we would 
have expected that in advising the Bank, its 
solicitors, as professional advisors having 
expert knowledge of the relevant legal and 
factual issues likely to arise in such litigation, 
would at the very least have identified classes 
or types of documents that the Bank should 
search for and produce. Further, the solicitors 
would also have been expected to examine 
what the Bank in fact produced and consider, 
in this light, what classes of documents 
seemed to be missing. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The import of these passages is twofold. First, the 
Court of Appeal recognises that a strict compliance 
with judicial opinion charting the depths to which 
solicitors are expected to descend with their clients in 
the search for and review of discoverable documents 
needs to be moderated in light of the volumes of 
electronic documents that are accessible in this 
modern age. Delegation is possible but in order to do 
so, such delegation has to be ‘considered, informed 
and adequately supervised’. This author ventures to 
comment that delegation need not be confined to 
delegation to junior associates. Using search 
technology is a form of delegation and studies have 
shown that this is no less effective than traditional 
manual review.66 What then behoves the solicitor is to 
ensure that she advises her client on the options of 
relying on ocular review alone or to also make use of 
keyword searches or other technology assisted 
review. Should a client decide to make use of keyword 
searches or other technology assisted review, her 
duty extends beyond crafting search terms to 
supervision of the entire process of search, review 
and production. It goes without saying that the 
crafting of search terms is an exercise that needs to 
take into consideration and be informed by the 
factual and legal issues in the case at hand. 
Second, the solicitor has an obligation to consider 
whether certain classes or types of documents have 
been omitted by her client. Traditionally, the 
conscientious solicitor would review all documents 
identified by her client for disclosure during general 
discovery, identify any classes of documents that have 
been omitted for rectification before the list of 
documents is exchanged. This iterative process can be 
time consuming and an iterative cycle can be wasted 
should the client misunderstand the class of 
documents that he was required to locate. The use of 
search or other technology assisted review necessarily 
requires that the discussion of discoverable classes of 
documents take place during the time when search 
terms are fashioned. An exhaustive discussion of the 
classes of documents that are discoverable when 
crafting search terms can be an effective way to 
reduce the risk of missing out certain classes of 
discoverable documents. There is also the added 
benefit that when an e-discovery plan is agreed and 
adopted by parties, it may have the legal effect of 
avoiding any allegation of deficient discovery since 
parties have agreed on the list of search terms that is 
to be used. 
The obligations of solicitors in e-discovery extends to 
supervising the performance of the search. In Sanae 
                                                          
66 See Andrew Peck, ‘Search, Forward’, Law Technology News 
(October 2011), at pp 25 – 26, at 
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/TAR_c
onference/Panel_1-Background_Paper.pdf , citing Grossman & 
Cormack, ‘Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery can be more 
effective and more efficient than exhaustive manual review’ in 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology (Vol XVII, Issue 3) at p 1, 
at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i3/article11.pdf  and Roitblat, Kershaw 
& Oot, ‘Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: 
Computer Classification vs. Manual Review’ in Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and Technology, Vol 61, 
Issue 1, January 2010 at pp 70 – 80, at 
http://www.clearwellsystems.com/e-discovery-blog/wp-
content/uploads/2010/12/man-v-comp-doc-review.pdf . 
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Achar v Sci-Gen Ltd,67 the following observation was 
made at [23]: 
… In this regard, it would be best if the parties 
can, prior to any search, agree on which 
search engine or software is to be used, the 
preparation of the search engine prior to 
conducting the searches (eg, updating the 
search index or causing a fresh search index to 
be made) and how searches are to be 
conducted. This would minimise potential 
disputes as to whether the parties have 
discharged their discovery obligations. 
The template electronic discovery plan in the e-
discovery PD does not prescribe the details of how the 
search is to be prepared and performed. The solicitor 
will have to advise his client on various decisions, 
enlisting the expertise of e-discovery service providers 
as necessary but never delegating his primary duty to 
them. These decisions include the choice of software 
that is to be used to make a forensically sound copy of 
the storage medium or device. Sometimes, the parties 
can make use of the same software to perform the 
search. This is particularly the case where the search 
is conducted on the unallocated or slack space. Often, 
the image is loaded onto a separate document review 
system. That is the second choice that has to be 
made. The capability of the search engine in the 
document review system of choice will often be 
relevant during good faith discussions and any 
contested application over the search terms to be 
used. After this choice has been settled, the service 
provider will then load the files or forensic images and 
the search engine will have to be given sufficient time 
to compose the search index before searches can be 
performed. Finally, the search results – referred to as 
the production set – will be produced as an output 
from the document review system. These can either 
be loaded onto optical discs or other electronic 
storage devices to be handed over to the party 
entitled to discovery, or online access may be 
provided to them. The latter practice is common 
when parties agree to use the same document review 
system. The main reason that determines which 
approach is to be taken is the cost of engaging the 
service provider and the document review systems 
that it has to offer. 
                                                          
67 [2011] 3 SLR 967; [2011] SGHC 87. 
Digital originals 
One of the areas that the courts had to deal with is 
the question of what is an original electronic 
document and what are copies for the purpose of 
giving discovery. For a long time, the practice was to 
treat printed copies of electronic documents as the 
only copy for discovery and use at trial, without quite 
addressing the question of whether these are the 
original or copies. And since the practice of inspection 
is to provide photocopies of discoverable documents, 
with ocular inspection usually deferred and 
sometimes indefinitely, many trials had been run on 
copies of electronic documents without ever having to 
address this question. In those early days, the 
question of production and inspection of original 
electronic documents had often only cropped up in 
the context of a forensic inspection of an electronic 
storage device such as a hard disk.68 
This area was brought into focus in the case of Fermin 
Aldabe v Standard Chartered Bank,69 which involved 
the inspection of e-mails. The plaintiff had been 
provided with printed copies of the defendant’s e-
mails and had requested for access to metadata with 
were not present in the printed copies but which 
could be displayed from the digital data (header 
information) of the e-mails. The case established that 
the original of an electronic document is the copy that 
is stored electronically in the repositories of the party 
giving discovery. It follows that the native format of 
that electronic document will be the format in which 
this original is stored. Hence, printing the e-mail 
produced a copy of the e-mail. It also follows that if a 
PDF or TIFF version of an electronic document is 
produced during discovery, these are also copies and 
not the originals. 
When it comes to the question of inspection, that 
must be given of the electronic document in its native 
format as it exists within the possession, custody or 
power of the party giving discovery. When dealing 
with electronic documents, the provision of a 
forensically sound copy – that is to say, a digital 
facsimile that duplicates internally stored system 
metadata as well – has the same practical effect as 
giving inspection since it is a perfect reproduction of 
the original, without loss of any information. 
Inspection is thus a procedure rendered otiose and 
                                                          
68 Alliance Management SA v Pendleton Lane P [2007] 4 SLR(R) 
343; [2007] SGHC 133. 
69 [2009] SGHC 194. 
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outmoded by the provision of forensically sound 
copies. Section 10 of the Electronic Transactions Act 
(Cap 88) refers to the qualities of a forensically sound 
copy as its ‘integrity’, which in turn is defined with 
reference to ‘whether the information has remained 
complete and unaltered’.70 Hence,  
… it might be convenient to change the 
conceptual framework concerning digital 
data. Rather than question whether a 
document in digital format is an original or a 
copy, it might be more useful and relevant to 
refer to the proof of authenticity, or 
provenance, or reliability of a digital file.71 
In its purest sense, the inspection of an electronic 
document involves identifying where in the 
repositories of the disclosing party it exists and 
making arrangements for that softcopy to be 
produced. As explained in Fermin Aldabe, the e-
discovery PD requires that the party giving discovery 
provides ‘reasonable means and assistance … to 
inspect the electronically stored documents in their 
native format.’72 With printed documents, all that was 
required was a room with a light source in order to 
give effect to the right of inspection. For electronic 
documents, this principle required that the party 
giving discovery provide access to a computer with 
the right software installed and with access to the 
electronic document that is to be inspected.73 This is 
the provision of reasonable means. Nothing more is 
required if the party giving discovery is content to 
allow the party entitled to discovery free access to 
this computer. However, where the software is not 
one that the party entitled to discovery is familiar with 
or where the party giving discovery does not wish to 
provide unfettered access to the computer, then an 
operator should be assigned by the party giving 
discovery to operate the software, calling up the 
electronic document to be inspected and operating 
the software to display the metadata when necessary. 
This is the provision of reasonable assistance. 
When it comes to the provision of copies of electronic 
documents, the more recent case of Wartsila Ship 
Design Singapore Pte Ltd v Liu Jiachun74 affirmed the 
                                                          
70 Section 10(2)(a) of the Electronic Transactions Act (Cap 88). 
71 Stephen Mason, ed, Electronic Evidence (3rd edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2012), at [10.36]. 
72 Para 50, e-discovery PD. 
73 See also Electronic Evidence, at [2.04]. 
74 [2014] SGHCR 13. 
e-discovery PD’s preference that copies of 
discoverable documents should be provided in their 
native format unless parties have come to an 
agreement on an alternate format. Further, the court 
held that the list of reasonably usable formats that is 
included in the e-discovery PD did not provide a safe 
harbour to the party giving discovery. His obligation to 
provide copies could not be discharged by providing 
copies (not being in native format) in one of the 
formats found on the list without first securing the 
agreement of the party entitled to discovery. Hence, 
the party giving discovery was ordered to re-tender 
copies in this case. 
Concluding observations 
It should not be surprising that the number of cases 
that have been generated in a relatively short (by the 
common law measure of time) span of five years 
when one considers the pervasiveness of electronic 
documents in this modern age. The clear refrain from 
the courts have been that with the burgeoning 
volume of discoverable electronic documents, parties 
have to adopt efficient and cost-effective practices in 
order to manage litigation costs. In the area of 
discovery, this meant that an overly pedantic 
approach in finding every document and pursuing 
every lead cannot be adopted except in the most 
exceptional of cases. The rule of proportionality 
required that a more sensible and measured approach 
be taken, and the courts are prepared to give the 
parties a certain leeway in order to achieve this. The 
e-discovery PD puts in place a set of guidance to 
encourage good faith discussions at all stages in the 
discovery process, and provides lists, template plans 
and protocols to help parties along with the process. 
The courts have reinforced this message with 
repeated exhortation for the parties to engage in 
interlocutory discourse conducted in good faith and 
with a collaborative spirit in order to achieve middle 
ground, and will make give directions in order to 
facilitate this. 
Another trend that can be seen is the adoption of 
technology as a tool that the courts and the parties 
can use in order to manage litigation costs and to 
encourage efficient practices. Clear statements have 
been made of the expectation that counsel can no 
longer hide behind the veneer of not having access to 
the proper software as a means of adhering to 
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photocopier-and-paper discovery practices.75 Hence, 
many of the cases have been focused on how search 
terms ought to be crafted and in reinforcing the 
message that discoverable documents ought to be 
supplied in softcopy. This will enable the adoption of 
technology in the subsequent stages of litigation 
where documents are reviewed, witness statements 
prepared and lead counsel gets up for cross-
examination. 
As much ground as has been covered, there are still 
new frontiers to be explored. We have probably only 
started probing the boundaries of the jurisdictional 
issues when it comes to discovery of online 
documents. The current trend is for software to be 
offered as an online service (instead of the previous 
shrink-wrap and click-wrap software) and online 
storage is extending beyond web mail and large file 
transfers. An increasing proportion of electronic 
documents will shift from local to online repositories. 
The appeal of cloud computing will likely mean that 
one day soon, the courts in Singapore will have to 
grapple with foreign blocking statutes. 
Another area where case law can be expected to 
develop is the boundaries of proportionality and its 
interplay with the concept of documents not being 
reasonably accessible where electronic documents are 
stored or accessible online. Judicial pronouncement 
and the e-discovery PD has set the tone as to what 
electronic documents are considered not to be 
reasonably accessible insofar as these are stored 
locally or off-line – hard disk drives and back-up tapes 
– but the boundaries have yet to be drawn for online 
storage. One may have an idea of how the courts can 
be expected to rule by extrapolating the treatment of 
web mail to online storage repositories of other types 
of electronic documents. However, moving beyond 
online documents that are readily accessible to those 
that have been deleted and which may possibly be 
restored upon request, the issue will be where the 
boundary is drawn. Too ready an issuance of a 
preservation and disclosure order may be unduly 
burdensome on the providers of online storage 
services, who are usually innocent bystanders to the 
litigation. We can expect some interesting 
developments in this area as the courts balance 
‘relevance and materiality’ against ‘proportionality 
                                                          
75 See Deutsche Bank AG v Chang Tse Wen and others [2010] 
SGHC 125 where the court opined at [36] that it was ‘unacceptable 
that Plaintiff’s solicitors should raise objections to electronic 
discovery that is essentially premised on their (and not the Plaintiff’s) 
lack of the requisite software programme’. 
and economy’ in future cases. To conclude, one can 
only say that the next five years will probably be more 
exciting than the last five. 
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